Momentum-Apps/esubghz_chat/crypto/gcm.c

/******************************************************************************
*
* THIS SOURCE CODE IS HEREBY PLACED INTO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN FOR THE GOOD OF ALL
*
* This is a simple and straightforward implementation of AES-GCM authenticated
* encryption. The focus of this work was correctness & accuracy. It is written
* in straight 'C' without any particular focus upon optimization or speed. It
* should be endian (memory byte order) neutral since the few places that care
* are handled explicitly.
*
* This implementation of AES-GCM was created by Steven M. Gibson of GRC.com.
*
* It is intended for general purpose use, but was written in support of GRC's
* reference implementation of the SQRL (Secure Quick Reliable Login) client.
*
* See:    http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP-800-38D.pdf
*         http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/documents/proposedmodes/
*         gcm/gcm-revised-spec.pdf
*
* NO COPYRIGHT IS CLAIMED IN THIS WORK, HOWEVER, NEITHER IS ANY WARRANTY MADE
* REGARDING ITS FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR PURPOSE. USE IT AT YOUR OWN RISK.
*
*******************************************************************************/

#include "gcm.h"
#include "aes.h"

/******************************************************************************
 *                      ==== IMPLEMENTATION WARNING ====
 *
 *  This code was developed for use within SQRL's fixed environmnent. Thus, it
 *  is somewhat less "general purpose" than it would be if it were designed as
 *  a general purpose AES-GCM library. Specifically, it bothers with almost NO
 *  error checking on parameter limits, buffer bounds, etc. It assumes that it
 *  is being invoked by its author or by someone who understands the values it
 *  expects to receive. Its behavior will be undefined otherwise.
 *
 *  All functions that might fail are defined to return 'ints' to indicate a
 *  problem. Most do not do so now. But this allows for error propagation out
 *  of internal functions if robust error checking should ever be desired.
 *
 ******************************************************************************/

/* Calculating the "GHASH"
 *
 * There are many ways of calculating the so-called GHASH in software, each with
 * a traditional size vs performance tradeoff.  The GHASH (Galois field hash) is
 * an intriguing construction which takes two 128-bit strings (also the cipher's
 * block size and the fundamental operation size for the system) and hashes them
 * into a third 128-bit result.
 *
 * Many implementation solutions have been worked out that use large precomputed
 * table lookups in place of more time consuming bit fiddling, and this approach
 * can be scaled easily upward or downward as needed to change the time/space
 * tradeoff. It's been studied extensively and there's a solid body of theory and
 * practice.  For example, without using any lookup tables an implementation
 * might obtain 119 cycles per byte throughput, whereas using a simple, though
 * large, key-specific 64 kbyte 8-bit lookup table the performance jumps to 13
 * cycles per byte.
 *
 * And Intel's processors have, since 2010, included an instruction which does
 * the entire 128x128->128 bit job in just several 64x64->128 bit pieces.
 *
 * Since SQRL is interactive, and only processing a few 128-bit blocks, I've
 * settled upon a relatively slower but appealing small-table compromise which
 * folds a bunch of not only time consuming but also bit twiddling into a simple
 * 16-entry table which is attributed to Victor Shoup's 1996 work while at
 * Bellcore: "On Fast and Provably Secure MessageAuthentication Based on
 * Universal Hashing."  See: http://www.shoup.net/papers/macs.pdf
 * See, also section 4.1 of the "gcm-revised-spec" cited above.
 */

/*
 *  This 16-entry table of pre-computed constants is used by the
 *  GHASH multiplier to improve over a strictly table-free but
 *  significantly slower 128x128 bit multiple within GF(2^128).
 */
static const uint64_t last4[16] = {
    0x0000,
    0x1c20,
    0x3840,
    0x2460,
    0x7080,
    0x6ca0,
    0x48c0,
    0x54e0,
    0xe100,
    0xfd20,
    0xd940,
    0xc560,
    0x9180,
    0x8da0,
    0xa9c0,
    0xb5e0};

/*
 * Platform Endianness Neutralizing Load and Store Macro definitions
 * GCM wants platform-neutral Big Endian (BE) byte ordering
 */
#define GET_UINT32_BE(n, b, i)                                              \
    {                                                                       \
        (n) = ((uint32_t)(b)[(i)] << 24) | ((uint32_t)(b)[(i) + 1] << 16) | \
              ((uint32_t)(b)[(i) + 2] << 8) | ((uint32_t)(b)[(i) + 3]);     \
    }

#define PUT_UINT32_BE(n, b, i)             \
    {                                      \
        (b)[(i)] = (uchar)((n) >> 24);     \
        (b)[(i) + 1] = (uchar)((n) >> 16); \
        (b)[(i) + 2] = (uchar)((n) >> 8);  \
        (b)[(i) + 3] = (uchar)((n));       \
    }

/******************************************************************************
 *
 *  GCM_INITIALIZE
 *
 *  Must be called once to initialize the GCM library.
 *
 *  At present, this only calls the AES keygen table generator, which expands
 *  the AES keying tables for use. This is NOT A THREAD-SAFE function, so it
 *  MUST be called during system initialization before a multi-threading
 *  environment is running.
 *
 ******************************************************************************/
int gcm_initialize(void) {
    aes_init_keygen_tables();
    return (0);
}

/******************************************************************************
 *
 *  GCM_MULT
 *
 *  Performs a GHASH operation on the 128-bit input vector 'x', setting
 *  the 128-bit output vector to 'x' times H using our precomputed tables.
 *  'x' and 'output' are seen as elements of GCM's GF(2^128) Galois field.
 *
 ******************************************************************************/
static void gcm_mult(
    gcm_context* ctx, // pointer to established context
    const uchar x[16], // pointer to 128-bit input vector
    uchar output[16]) // pointer to 128-bit output vector
{
    int i;
    uchar lo, hi, rem;
    uint64_t zh, zl;

    lo = (uchar)(x[15] & 0x0f);
    hi = (uchar)(x[15] >> 4);
    zh = ctx->HH[lo];
    zl = ctx->HL[lo];

    for(i = 15; i >= 0; i--) {
        lo = (uchar)(x[i] & 0x0f);
        hi = (uchar)(x[i] >> 4);

        if(i != 15) {
            rem = (uchar)(zl & 0x0f);
            zl = (zh << 60) | (zl >> 4);
            zh = (zh >> 4);
            zh ^= (uint64_t)last4[rem] << 48;
            zh ^= ctx->HH[lo];
            zl ^= ctx->HL[lo];
        }
        rem = (uchar)(zl & 0x0f);
        zl = (zh << 60) | (zl >> 4);
        zh = (zh >> 4);
        zh ^= (uint64_t)last4[rem] << 48;
        zh ^= ctx->HH[hi];
        zl ^= ctx->HL[hi];
    }
    PUT_UINT32_BE(zh >> 32, output, 0);
    PUT_UINT32_BE(zh, output, 4);
    PUT_UINT32_BE(zl >> 32, output, 8);
    PUT_UINT32_BE(zl, output, 12);
}

/******************************************************************************
 *
 *  GCM_SETKEY
 *
 *  This is called to set the AES-GCM key. It initializes the AES key
 *  and populates the gcm context's pre-calculated HTables.
 *
 ******************************************************************************/
int gcm_setkey(
    gcm_context* ctx, // pointer to caller-provided gcm context
    const uchar* key, // pointer to the AES encryption key
    const uint keysize) // size in bytes (must be 16, 24, 32 for
// 128, 192 or 256-bit keys respectively)
{
    int ret, i, j;
    uint64_t hi, lo;
    uint64_t vl, vh;
    unsigned char h[16];

    memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(gcm_context)); // zero caller-provided GCM context
    memset(h, 0, 16); // initialize the block to encrypt

    // encrypt the null 128-bit block to generate a key-based value
    // which is then used to initialize our GHASH lookup tables
    if((ret = aes_setkey(&ctx->aes_ctx, ENCRYPT, key, keysize)) != 0) return (ret);
    if((ret = aes_cipher(&ctx->aes_ctx, h, h)) != 0) return (ret);

    GET_UINT32_BE(hi, h, 0); // pack h as two 64-bit ints, big-endian
    GET_UINT32_BE(lo, h, 4);
    vh = (uint64_t)hi << 32 | lo;

    GET_UINT32_BE(hi, h, 8);
    GET_UINT32_BE(lo, h, 12);
    vl = (uint64_t)hi << 32 | lo;

    ctx->HL[8] = vl; // 8 = 1000 corresponds to 1 in GF(2^128)
    ctx->HH[8] = vh;
    ctx->HH[0] = 0; // 0 corresponds to 0 in GF(2^128)
    ctx->HL[0] = 0;

    for(i = 4; i > 0; i >>= 1) {
        uint32_t T = (uint32_t)(vl & 1) * 0xe1000000U;
        vl = (vh << 63) | (vl >> 1);
        vh = (vh >> 1) ^ ((uint64_t)T << 32);
        ctx->HL[i] = vl;
        ctx->HH[i] = vh;
    }
    for(i = 2; i < 16; i <<= 1) {
        uint64_t *HiL = ctx->HL + i, *HiH = ctx->HH + i;
        vh = *HiH;
        vl = *HiL;
        for(j = 1; j < i; j++) {
            HiH[j] = vh ^ ctx->HH[j];
            HiL[j] = vl ^ ctx->HL[j];
        }
    }
    return (0);
}

/******************************************************************************
 *
 *    GCM processing occurs four phases: SETKEY, START, UPDATE and FINISH.
 *
 *  SETKEY: 
 *  
 *   START: Sets the Encryption/Decryption mode.
 *          Accepts the initialization vector and additional data.
 *
 *  UPDATE: Encrypts or decrypts the plaintext or ciphertext.
 *
 *  FINISH: Performs a final GHASH to generate the authentication tag.
 *
 ******************************************************************************
 *
 *  GCM_START
 *
 *  Given a user-provided GCM context, this initializes it, sets the encryption
 *  mode, and preprocesses the initialization vector and additional AEAD data.
 *
 ******************************************************************************/
int gcm_start(
    gcm_context* ctx, // pointer to user-provided GCM context
    int mode, // GCM_ENCRYPT or GCM_DECRYPT
    const uchar* iv, // pointer to initialization vector
    size_t iv_len, // IV length in bytes (should == 12)
    const uchar* add, // ptr to additional AEAD data (NULL if none)
    size_t add_len) // length of additional AEAD data (bytes)
{
    int ret; // our error return if the AES encrypt fails
    uchar work_buf[16]; // XOR source built from provided IV if len != 16
    const uchar* p; // general purpose array pointer
    size_t use_len; // byte count to process, up to 16 bytes
    size_t i; // local loop iterator

    // since the context might be reused under the same key
    // we zero the working buffers for this next new process
    memset(ctx->y, 0x00, sizeof(ctx->y));
    memset(ctx->buf, 0x00, sizeof(ctx->buf));
    ctx->len = 0;
    ctx->add_len = 0;

    ctx->mode = mode; // set the GCM encryption/decryption mode
    ctx->aes_ctx.mode = ENCRYPT; // GCM *always* runs AES in ENCRYPTION mode

    if(iv_len == 12) { // GCM natively uses a 12-byte, 96-bit IV
        memcpy(ctx->y, iv, iv_len); // copy the IV to the top of the 'y' buff
        ctx->y[15] = 1; // start "counting" from 1 (not 0)
    } else // if we don't have a 12-byte IV, we GHASH whatever we've been given
    {
        memset(work_buf, 0x00, 16); // clear the working buffer
        PUT_UINT32_BE(iv_len * 8, work_buf, 12); // place the IV into buffer

        p = iv;
        while(iv_len > 0) {
            use_len = (iv_len < 16) ? iv_len : 16;
            for(i = 0; i < use_len; i++)
                ctx->y[i] ^= p[i];
            gcm_mult(ctx, ctx->y, ctx->y);
            iv_len -= use_len;
            p += use_len;
        }
        for(i = 0; i < 16; i++)
            ctx->y[i] ^= work_buf[i];
        gcm_mult(ctx, ctx->y, ctx->y);
    }
    if((ret = aes_cipher(&ctx->aes_ctx, ctx->y, ctx->base_ectr)) != 0) return (ret);

    ctx->add_len = add_len;
    p = add;
    while(add_len > 0) {
        use_len = (add_len < 16) ? add_len : 16;
        for(i = 0; i < use_len; i++)
            ctx->buf[i] ^= p[i];
        gcm_mult(ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf);
        add_len -= use_len;
        p += use_len;
    }
    return (0);
}

/******************************************************************************
 *
 *  GCM_UPDATE
 *
 *  This is called once or more to process bulk plaintext or ciphertext data.
 *  We give this some number of bytes of input and it returns the same number
 *  of output bytes. If called multiple times (which is fine) all but the final
 *  invocation MUST be called with length mod 16 == 0. (Only the final call can
 *  have a partial block length of < 128 bits.)
 *
 ******************************************************************************/
int gcm_update(
    gcm_context* ctx, // pointer to user-provided GCM context
    size_t length, // length, in bytes, of data to process
    const uchar* input, // pointer to source data
    uchar* output) // pointer to destination data
{
    int ret; // our error return if the AES encrypt fails
    uchar ectr[16]; // counter-mode cipher output for XORing
    size_t use_len; // byte count to process, up to 16 bytes
    size_t i; // local loop iterator

    ctx->len += length; // bump the GCM context's running length count

    while(length > 0) {
        // clamp the length to process at 16 bytes
        use_len = (length < 16) ? length : 16;

        // increment the context's 128-bit IV||Counter 'y' vector
        for(i = 16; i > 12; i--)
            if(++ctx->y[i - 1] != 0) break;

        // encrypt the context's 'y' vector under the established key
        if((ret = aes_cipher(&ctx->aes_ctx, ctx->y, ectr)) != 0) return (ret);

        // encrypt or decrypt the input to the output
        if(ctx->mode == ENCRYPT) {
            for(i = 0; i < use_len; i++) {
                // XOR the cipher's ouptut vector (ectr) with our input
                output[i] = (uchar)(ectr[i] ^ input[i]);
                // now we mix in our data into the authentication hash.
                // if we're ENcrypting we XOR in the post-XOR (output)
                // results, but if we're DEcrypting we XOR in the input
                // data
                ctx->buf[i] ^= output[i];
            }
        } else {
            for(i = 0; i < use_len; i++) {
                // but if we're DEcrypting we XOR in the input data first,
                // i.e. before saving to ouput data, otherwise if the input
                // and output buffer are the same (inplace decryption) we
                // would not get the correct auth tag

                ctx->buf[i] ^= input[i];

                // XOR the cipher's ouptut vector (ectr) with our input
                output[i] = (uchar)(ectr[i] ^ input[i]);
            }
        }
        gcm_mult(ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf); // perform a GHASH operation

        length -= use_len; // drop the remaining byte count to process
        input += use_len; // bump our input pointer forward
        output += use_len; // bump our output pointer forward
    }
    return (0);
}

/******************************************************************************
 *
 *  GCM_FINISH
 *
 *  This is called once after all calls to GCM_UPDATE to finalize the GCM.
 *  It performs the final GHASH to produce the resulting authentication TAG.
 *
 ******************************************************************************/
int gcm_finish(
    gcm_context* ctx, // pointer to user-provided GCM context
    uchar* tag, // pointer to buffer which receives the tag
    size_t tag_len) // length, in bytes, of the tag-receiving buf
{
    uchar work_buf[16];
    uint64_t orig_len = ctx->len * 8;
    uint64_t orig_add_len = ctx->add_len * 8;
    size_t i;

    if(tag_len != 0) memcpy(tag, ctx->base_ectr, tag_len);

    if(orig_len || orig_add_len) {
        memset(work_buf, 0x00, 16);

        PUT_UINT32_BE((orig_add_len >> 32), work_buf, 0);
        PUT_UINT32_BE((orig_add_len), work_buf, 4);
        PUT_UINT32_BE((orig_len >> 32), work_buf, 8);
        PUT_UINT32_BE((orig_len), work_buf, 12);

        for(i = 0; i < 16; i++)
            ctx->buf[i] ^= work_buf[i];
        gcm_mult(ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf);
        for(i = 0; i < tag_len; i++)
            tag[i] ^= ctx->buf[i];
    }
    return (0);
}

/******************************************************************************
 *
 *  GCM_CRYPT_AND_TAG
 *
 *  This either encrypts or decrypts the user-provided data and, either
 *  way, generates an authentication tag of the requested length. It must be
 *  called with a GCM context whose key has already been set with GCM_SETKEY.
 *
 *  The user would typically call this explicitly to ENCRYPT a buffer of data
 *  and optional associated data, and produce its an authentication tag.
 *
 *  To reverse the process the user would typically call the companion
 *  GCM_AUTH_DECRYPT function to decrypt data and verify a user-provided
 *  authentication tag.  The GCM_AUTH_DECRYPT function calls this function
 *  to perform its decryption and tag generation, which it then compares.
 *
 ******************************************************************************/
int gcm_crypt_and_tag(
    gcm_context* ctx, // gcm context with key already setup
    int mode, // cipher direction: GCM_ENCRYPT or GCM_DECRYPT
    const uchar* iv, // pointer to the 12-byte initialization vector
    size_t iv_len, // byte length if the IV. should always be 12
    const uchar* add, // pointer to the non-ciphered additional data
    size_t add_len, // byte length of the additional AEAD data
    const uchar* input, // pointer to the cipher data source
    uchar* output, // pointer to the cipher data destination
    size_t length, // byte length of the cipher data
    uchar* tag, // pointer to the tag to be generated
    size_t tag_len) // byte length of the tag to be generated
{ /*
       assuming that the caller has already invoked gcm_setkey to
       prepare the gcm context with the keying material, we simply
       invoke each of the three GCM sub-functions in turn...
    */
    gcm_start(ctx, mode, iv, iv_len, add, add_len);
    gcm_update(ctx, length, input, output);
    gcm_finish(ctx, tag, tag_len);
    return (0);
}

/******************************************************************************
 *
 *  GCM_AUTH_DECRYPT
 *
 *  This DECRYPTS a user-provided data buffer with optional associated data.
 *  It then verifies a user-supplied authentication tag against the tag just
 *  re-created during decryption to verify that the data has not been altered.
 *
 *  This function calls GCM_CRYPT_AND_TAG (above) to perform the decryption
 *  and authentication tag generation.
 *
 ******************************************************************************/
int gcm_auth_decrypt(
    gcm_context* ctx, // gcm context with key already setup
    const uchar* iv, // pointer to the 12-byte initialization vector
    size_t iv_len, // byte length if the IV. should always be 12
    const uchar* add, // pointer to the non-ciphered additional data
    size_t add_len, // byte length of the additional AEAD data
    const uchar* input, // pointer to the cipher data source
    uchar* output, // pointer to the cipher data destination
    size_t length, // byte length of the cipher data
    const uchar* tag, // pointer to the tag to be authenticated
    size_t tag_len) // byte length of the tag <= 16
{
    uchar check_tag[16]; // the tag generated and returned by decryption
    int diff; // an ORed flag to detect authentication errors
    size_t i; // our local iterator
    /*
       we use GCM_DECRYPT_AND_TAG (above) to perform our decryption
       (which is an identical XORing to reverse the previous one)
       and also to re-generate the matching authentication tag
    */
    gcm_crypt_and_tag(
        ctx, DECRYPT, iv, iv_len, add, add_len, input, output, length, check_tag, tag_len);

    // now we verify the authentication tag in 'constant time'
    for(diff = 0, i = 0; i < tag_len; i++)
        diff |= tag[i] ^ check_tag[i];

    if(diff != 0) { // see whether any bits differed?
        memset(output, 0, length); // if so... wipe the output data
        return (GCM_AUTH_FAILURE); // return GCM_AUTH_FAILURE
    }
    return (0);
}

/******************************************************************************
 *
 *  GCM_ZERO_CTX
 *
 *  The GCM context contains both the GCM context and the AES context.
 *  This includes keying and key-related material which is security-
 *  sensitive, so it MUST be zeroed after use. This function does that.
 *
 ******************************************************************************/
void gcm_zero_ctx(gcm_context* ctx) {
    // zero the context originally provided to us
    memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(gcm_context));
}