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Add AES-GCM sources

These are copied from Markus Kosmal, who released them into the public
domain at https://github.com/mko-x/SharedAES-GCM
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Modificáronse 6 ficheiros con 1326 adicións e 0 borrados
  1. 46 0
      crypto/aes-gcm.c
  2. 18 0
      crypto/aes-gcm.h
  3. 483 0
      crypto/aes.c
  4. 81 0
      crypto/aes.h
  5. 511 0
      crypto/gcm.c
  6. 187 0
      crypto/gcm.h

+ 46 - 0
crypto/aes-gcm.c

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+//
+//  aes-gcm.c
+//  Pods
+//
+//  Created by Markus Kosmal on 20/11/14.
+//
+//
+
+#include "aes-gcm.h"
+
+int aes_gcm_encrypt(unsigned char* output, const unsigned char* input, int input_length, const unsigned char* key, const size_t key_len, const unsigned char * iv, const size_t iv_len){
+    
+    int ret = 0;                // our return value
+    gcm_context ctx;            // includes the AES context structure
+    
+    size_t tag_len = 0;
+    unsigned char * tag_buf = NULL;
+    
+    gcm_setkey( &ctx, key, (const uint)key_len );
+    
+    ret = gcm_crypt_and_tag( &ctx, ENCRYPT, iv, iv_len, NULL, 0,
+                            input, output, input_length, tag_buf, tag_len);
+    
+    gcm_zero_ctx( &ctx );
+    
+    return( ret );
+}
+
+int aes_gcm_decrypt(unsigned char* output, const unsigned char* input, int input_length, const unsigned char* key, const size_t key_len, const unsigned char * iv, const size_t iv_len){
+    
+    int ret = 0;                // our return value
+    gcm_context ctx;            // includes the AES context structure
+    
+    size_t tag_len = 0;
+    unsigned char * tag_buf = NULL;
+    
+    gcm_setkey( &ctx, key, (const uint)key_len );
+    
+    ret = gcm_crypt_and_tag( &ctx, DECRYPT, iv, iv_len, NULL, 0,
+                            input, output, input_length, tag_buf, tag_len);
+    
+    gcm_zero_ctx( &ctx );
+    
+    return( ret );
+
+}

+ 18 - 0
crypto/aes-gcm.h

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+//
+//  aes-gcm.h
+//  MKo
+//
+//  Created by Markus Kosmal on 20/11/14.
+//
+//
+
+#ifndef mko_aes_gcm_h
+#define mko_aes_gcm_h
+
+#include "gcm.h"  
+
+int aes_gcm_encrypt(unsigned char* output, const unsigned char* input, int input_length, const unsigned char* key, const size_t key_len, const unsigned char * iv, const size_t iv_len);
+
+int aes_gcm_decrypt(unsigned char* output, const unsigned char* input, int input_length, const unsigned char* key, const size_t key_len, const unsigned char * iv, const size_t iv_len);
+
+#endif

+ 483 - 0
crypto/aes.c

@@ -0,0 +1,483 @@
+/******************************************************************************
+*
+* THIS SOURCE CODE IS HEREBY PLACED INTO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN FOR THE GOOD OF ALL
+*
+* This is a simple and straightforward implementation of the AES Rijndael
+* 128-bit block cipher designed by Vincent Rijmen and Joan Daemen. The focus
+* of this work was correctness & accuracy.  It is written in 'C' without any
+* particular focus upon optimization or speed. It should be endian (memory
+* byte order) neutral since the few places that care are handled explicitly.
+*
+* This implementation of Rijndael was created by Steven M. Gibson of GRC.com.
+*
+* It is intended for general purpose use, but was written in support of GRC's
+* reference implementation of the SQRL (Secure Quick Reliable Login) client.
+*
+* See:    http://csrc.nist.gov/archive/aes/rijndael/wsdindex.html
+*
+* NO COPYRIGHT IS CLAIMED IN THIS WORK, HOWEVER, NEITHER IS ANY WARRANTY MADE
+* REGARDING ITS FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR PURPOSE. USE IT AT YOUR OWN RISK.
+*
+*******************************************************************************/
+
+#include "aes.h"
+
+static int aes_tables_inited = 0;   // run-once flag for performing key
+                                    // expasion table generation (see below)
+/*
+ *  The following static local tables must be filled-in before the first use of
+ *  the GCM or AES ciphers. They are used for the AES key expansion/scheduling
+ *  and once built are read-only and thread safe. The "gcm_initialize" function
+ *  must be called once during system initialization to populate these arrays
+ *  for subsequent use by the AES key scheduler. If they have not been built
+ *  before attempted use, an error will be returned to the caller.
+ *
+ *  NOTE: GCM Encryption/Decryption does NOT REQUIRE AES decryption. Since
+ *  GCM uses AES in counter-mode, where the AES cipher output is XORed with
+ *  the GCM input, we ONLY NEED AES encryption.  Thus, to save space AES
+ *  decryption is typically disabled by setting AES_DECRYPTION to 0 in aes.h.
+ */
+                            // We always need our forward tables
+static uchar FSb[256];      // Forward substitution box (FSb)
+static uint32_t FT0[256];   // Forward key schedule assembly tables
+static uint32_t FT1[256];
+static uint32_t FT2[256];
+static uint32_t FT3[256];
+
+#if AES_DECRYPTION          // We ONLY need reverse for decryption
+static uchar RSb[256];      // Reverse substitution box (RSb)
+static uint32_t RT0[256];   // Reverse key schedule assembly tables
+static uint32_t RT1[256];
+static uint32_t RT2[256];
+static uint32_t RT3[256];
+#endif                      /* AES_DECRYPTION */
+
+static uint32_t RCON[10];   // AES round constants
+
+/* 
+ * Platform Endianness Neutralizing Load and Store Macro definitions
+ * AES wants platform-neutral Little Endian (LE) byte ordering
+ */
+#define GET_UINT32_LE(n,b,i) {                  \
+    (n) = ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i)    ]       )     \
+        | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 1] <<  8 )     \
+        | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 2] << 16 )     \
+        | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 3] << 24 ); }
+
+#define PUT_UINT32_LE(n,b,i) {                  \
+    (b)[(i)    ] = (uchar) ( (n)       );       \
+    (b)[(i) + 1] = (uchar) ( (n) >>  8 );       \
+    (b)[(i) + 2] = (uchar) ( (n) >> 16 );       \
+    (b)[(i) + 3] = (uchar) ( (n) >> 24 ); }
+
+/*
+ *  AES forward and reverse encryption round processing macros
+ */
+#define AES_FROUND(X0,X1,X2,X3,Y0,Y1,Y2,Y3)     \
+{                                               \
+    X0 = *RK++ ^ FT0[ ( Y0       ) & 0xFF ] ^   \
+                 FT1[ ( Y1 >>  8 ) & 0xFF ] ^   \
+                 FT2[ ( Y2 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] ^   \
+                 FT3[ ( Y3 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ];    \
+                                                \
+    X1 = *RK++ ^ FT0[ ( Y1       ) & 0xFF ] ^   \
+                 FT1[ ( Y2 >>  8 ) & 0xFF ] ^   \
+                 FT2[ ( Y3 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] ^   \
+                 FT3[ ( Y0 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ];    \
+                                                \
+    X2 = *RK++ ^ FT0[ ( Y2       ) & 0xFF ] ^   \
+                 FT1[ ( Y3 >>  8 ) & 0xFF ] ^   \
+                 FT2[ ( Y0 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] ^   \
+                 FT3[ ( Y1 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ];    \
+                                                \
+    X3 = *RK++ ^ FT0[ ( Y3       ) & 0xFF ] ^   \
+                 FT1[ ( Y0 >>  8 ) & 0xFF ] ^   \
+                 FT2[ ( Y1 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] ^   \
+                 FT3[ ( Y2 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ];    \
+}
+
+#define AES_RROUND(X0,X1,X2,X3,Y0,Y1,Y2,Y3)     \
+{                                               \
+    X0 = *RK++ ^ RT0[ ( Y0       ) & 0xFF ] ^   \
+                 RT1[ ( Y3 >>  8 ) & 0xFF ] ^   \
+                 RT2[ ( Y2 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] ^   \
+                 RT3[ ( Y1 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ];    \
+                                                \
+    X1 = *RK++ ^ RT0[ ( Y1       ) & 0xFF ] ^   \
+                 RT1[ ( Y0 >>  8 ) & 0xFF ] ^   \
+                 RT2[ ( Y3 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] ^   \
+                 RT3[ ( Y2 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ];    \
+                                                \
+    X2 = *RK++ ^ RT0[ ( Y2       ) & 0xFF ] ^   \
+                 RT1[ ( Y1 >>  8 ) & 0xFF ] ^   \
+                 RT2[ ( Y0 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] ^   \
+                 RT3[ ( Y3 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ];    \
+                                                \
+    X3 = *RK++ ^ RT0[ ( Y3       ) & 0xFF ] ^   \
+                 RT1[ ( Y2 >>  8 ) & 0xFF ] ^   \
+                 RT2[ ( Y1 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] ^   \
+                 RT3[ ( Y0 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ];    \
+}
+
+/*
+ *  These macros improve the readability of the key
+ *  generation initialization code by collapsing
+ *  repetitive common operations into logical pieces.
+ */
+#define ROTL8(x) ( ( x << 8 ) & 0xFFFFFFFF ) | ( x >> 24 )
+#define XTIME(x) ( ( x << 1 ) ^ ( ( x & 0x80 ) ? 0x1B : 0x00 ) )
+#define MUL(x,y) ( ( x && y ) ? pow[(log[x]+log[y]) % 255] : 0 )
+#define MIX(x,y) { y = ( (y << 1) | (y >> 7) ) & 0xFF; x ^= y; }
+#define CPY128   { *RK++ = *SK++; *RK++ = *SK++; \
+                   *RK++ = *SK++; *RK++ = *SK++; }
+
+/******************************************************************************
+ *
+ *  AES_INIT_KEYGEN_TABLES
+ *
+ *  Fills the AES key expansion tables allocated above with their static
+ *  data. This is not "per key" data, but static system-wide read-only
+ *  table data. THIS FUNCTION IS NOT THREAD SAFE. It must be called once
+ *  at system initialization to setup the tables for all subsequent use.
+ *
+ ******************************************************************************/
+void aes_init_keygen_tables( void )
+{
+    int i, x, y, z;     // general purpose iteration and computation locals
+    int pow[256];
+    int log[256];
+
+    if (aes_tables_inited) return;
+
+    // fill the 'pow' and 'log' tables over GF(2^8)
+    for( i = 0, x = 1; i < 256; i++ )   {
+        pow[i] = x;
+        log[x] = i;
+        x = ( x ^ XTIME( x ) ) & 0xFF;
+    }
+    // compute the round constants
+    for( i = 0, x = 1; i < 10; i++ )    {
+        RCON[i] = (uint32_t) x;
+        x = XTIME( x ) & 0xFF;
+    }
+    // fill the forward and reverse substitution boxes
+    FSb[0x00] = 0x63;
+#if AES_DECRYPTION  // whether AES decryption is supported
+    RSb[0x63] = 0x00;
+#endif /* AES_DECRYPTION */
+
+    for( i = 1; i < 256; i++ )          {
+        x = y = pow[255 - log[i]];
+        MIX(x,y);
+        MIX(x,y);
+        MIX(x,y);
+        MIX(x,y); 
+        FSb[i] = (uchar) ( x ^= 0x63 );
+#if AES_DECRYPTION  // whether AES decryption is supported
+        RSb[x] = (uchar) i;
+#endif /* AES_DECRYPTION */
+
+    }
+    // generate the forward and reverse key expansion tables
+    for( i = 0; i < 256; i++ )          {
+        x = FSb[i];
+        y = XTIME( x ) & 0xFF;
+        z =  ( y ^ x ) & 0xFF;
+
+        FT0[i] = ( (uint32_t) y       ) ^ ( (uint32_t) x <<  8 ) ^
+                 ( (uint32_t) x << 16 ) ^ ( (uint32_t) z << 24 );
+
+        FT1[i] = ROTL8( FT0[i] );
+        FT2[i] = ROTL8( FT1[i] );
+        FT3[i] = ROTL8( FT2[i] );
+
+#if AES_DECRYPTION  // whether AES decryption is supported
+        x = RSb[i];
+
+        RT0[i] = ( (uint32_t) MUL( 0x0E, x )       ) ^
+                 ( (uint32_t) MUL( 0x09, x ) <<  8 ) ^
+                 ( (uint32_t) MUL( 0x0D, x ) << 16 ) ^
+                 ( (uint32_t) MUL( 0x0B, x ) << 24 );
+
+        RT1[i] = ROTL8( RT0[i] );
+        RT2[i] = ROTL8( RT1[i] );
+        RT3[i] = ROTL8( RT2[i] );
+#endif /* AES_DECRYPTION */
+    }
+    aes_tables_inited = 1;  // flag that the tables have been generated
+}                           // to permit subsequent use of the AES cipher
+
+/******************************************************************************
+ *
+ *  AES_SET_ENCRYPTION_KEY
+ *
+ *  This is called by 'aes_setkey' when we're establishing a key for
+ *  subsequent encryption.  We give it a pointer to the encryption
+ *  context, a pointer to the key, and the key's length in bytes.
+ *  Valid lengths are: 16, 24 or 32 bytes (128, 192, 256 bits).
+ *
+ ******************************************************************************/
+int aes_set_encryption_key( aes_context *ctx,
+                            const uchar *key,
+                            uint keysize )
+{
+    uint i;                 // general purpose iteration local
+    uint32_t *RK = ctx->rk; // initialize our RoundKey buffer pointer
+
+    for( i = 0; i < (keysize >> 2); i++ ) {
+        GET_UINT32_LE( RK[i], key, i << 2 );
+    }
+
+    switch( ctx->rounds )
+    {
+        case 10:
+            for( i = 0; i < 10; i++, RK += 4 ) {
+                RK[4]  = RK[0] ^ RCON[i] ^
+                ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( RK[3] >>  8 ) & 0xFF ]       ) ^
+                ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( RK[3] >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] <<  8 ) ^
+                ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( RK[3] >> 24 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^
+                ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( RK[3]       ) & 0xFF ] << 24 );
+
+                RK[5]  = RK[1] ^ RK[4];
+                RK[6]  = RK[2] ^ RK[5];
+                RK[7]  = RK[3] ^ RK[6];
+            }
+            break;
+
+        case 12:
+            for( i = 0; i < 8; i++, RK += 6 ) {
+                RK[6]  = RK[0] ^ RCON[i] ^
+                ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( RK[5] >>  8 ) & 0xFF ]       ) ^
+                ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( RK[5] >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] <<  8 ) ^
+                ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( RK[5] >> 24 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^
+                ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( RK[5]       ) & 0xFF ] << 24 );
+
+                RK[7]  = RK[1] ^ RK[6];
+                RK[8]  = RK[2] ^ RK[7];
+                RK[9]  = RK[3] ^ RK[8];
+                RK[10] = RK[4] ^ RK[9];
+                RK[11] = RK[5] ^ RK[10];
+            }
+            break;
+
+        case 14:
+            for( i = 0; i < 7; i++, RK += 8 ) {
+                RK[8]  = RK[0] ^ RCON[i] ^
+                ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( RK[7] >>  8 ) & 0xFF ]       ) ^
+                ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( RK[7] >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] <<  8 ) ^
+                ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( RK[7] >> 24 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^
+                ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( RK[7]       ) & 0xFF ] << 24 );
+
+                RK[9]  = RK[1] ^ RK[8];
+                RK[10] = RK[2] ^ RK[9];
+                RK[11] = RK[3] ^ RK[10];
+
+                RK[12] = RK[4] ^
+                ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( RK[11]       ) & 0xFF ]       ) ^
+                ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( RK[11] >>  8 ) & 0xFF ] <<  8 ) ^
+                ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( RK[11] >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^
+                ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( RK[11] >> 24 ) & 0xFF ] << 24 );
+
+                RK[13] = RK[5] ^ RK[12];
+                RK[14] = RK[6] ^ RK[13];
+                RK[15] = RK[7] ^ RK[14];
+            }
+            break;
+
+	default:
+	    return -1;
+    }
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
+#if AES_DECRYPTION  // whether AES decryption is supported
+
+/******************************************************************************
+ *
+ *  AES_SET_DECRYPTION_KEY
+ *
+ *  This is called by 'aes_setkey' when we're establishing a
+ *  key for subsequent decryption.  We give it a pointer to
+ *  the encryption context, a pointer to the key, and the key's
+ *  length in bits. Valid lengths are: 128, 192, or 256 bits.
+ *
+ ******************************************************************************/
+int aes_set_decryption_key( aes_context *ctx,
+                            const uchar *key,
+                            uint keysize )
+{
+    int i, j;
+    aes_context cty;            // a calling aes context for set_encryption_key
+    uint32_t *RK = ctx->rk;     // initialize our RoundKey buffer pointer
+    uint32_t *SK;
+    int ret;
+
+    cty.rounds = ctx->rounds;   // initialize our local aes context
+    cty.rk = cty.buf;           // round count and key buf pointer
+
+    if (( ret = aes_set_encryption_key( &cty, key, keysize )) != 0 )
+        return( ret );
+
+    SK = cty.rk + cty.rounds * 4;
+
+    CPY128  // copy a 128-bit block from *SK to *RK
+
+    for( i = ctx->rounds - 1, SK -= 8; i > 0; i--, SK -= 8 ) {
+        for( j = 0; j < 4; j++, SK++ ) {
+            *RK++ = RT0[ FSb[ ( *SK       ) & 0xFF ] ] ^
+                    RT1[ FSb[ ( *SK >>  8 ) & 0xFF ] ] ^
+                    RT2[ FSb[ ( *SK >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] ] ^
+                    RT3[ FSb[ ( *SK >> 24 ) & 0xFF ] ];
+        }
+    }
+    CPY128  // copy a 128-bit block from *SK to *RK
+    memset( &cty, 0, sizeof( aes_context ) );   // clear local aes context
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
+#endif /* AES_DECRYPTION */
+
+/******************************************************************************
+ *
+ *  AES_SETKEY
+ *
+ *  Invoked to establish the key schedule for subsequent encryption/decryption
+ *
+ ******************************************************************************/
+int aes_setkey( aes_context *ctx,   // AES context provided by our caller
+                int mode,           // ENCRYPT or DECRYPT flag
+                const uchar *key,   // pointer to the key
+                uint keysize )      // key length in bytes
+{
+    // since table initialization is not thread safe, we could either add
+    // system-specific mutexes and init the AES key generation tables on
+    // demand, or ask the developer to simply call "gcm_initialize" once during
+    // application startup before threading begins. That's what we choose.
+    if( !aes_tables_inited ) return ( -1 );  // fail the call when not inited.
+    
+    ctx->mode = mode;       // capture the key type we're creating
+    ctx->rk = ctx->buf;     // initialize our round key pointer
+
+    switch( keysize )       // set the rounds count based upon the keysize
+    {
+        case 16: ctx->rounds = 10; break;   // 16-byte, 128-bit key
+        case 24: ctx->rounds = 12; break;   // 24-byte, 192-bit key
+        case 32: ctx->rounds = 14; break;   // 32-byte, 256-bit key
+	default: return(-1);
+    }
+
+#if AES_DECRYPTION
+    if( mode == DECRYPT )   // expand our key for encryption or decryption
+        return( aes_set_decryption_key( ctx, key, keysize ) );
+    else     /* ENCRYPT */
+#endif /* AES_DECRYPTION */
+        return( aes_set_encryption_key( ctx, key, keysize ) );
+}
+
+/******************************************************************************
+ *
+ *  AES_CIPHER
+ *
+ *  Perform AES encryption and decryption.
+ *  The AES context will have been setup with the encryption mode
+ *  and all keying information appropriate for the task.
+ *
+ ******************************************************************************/
+int aes_cipher( aes_context *ctx,
+                    const uchar input[16],
+                    uchar output[16] )
+{
+    int i;
+    uint32_t *RK, X0, X1, X2, X3, Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3;   // general purpose locals
+
+    RK = ctx->rk;
+
+    GET_UINT32_LE( X0, input,  0 ); X0 ^= *RK++;    // load our 128-bit
+    GET_UINT32_LE( X1, input,  4 ); X1 ^= *RK++;    // input buffer in a storage
+    GET_UINT32_LE( X2, input,  8 ); X2 ^= *RK++;    // memory endian-neutral way
+    GET_UINT32_LE( X3, input, 12 ); X3 ^= *RK++;
+
+#if AES_DECRYPTION  // whether AES decryption is supported
+
+    if( ctx->mode == DECRYPT )
+    {
+        for( i = (ctx->rounds >> 1) - 1; i > 0; i-- )
+        {
+            AES_RROUND( Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3, X0, X1, X2, X3 );
+            AES_RROUND( X0, X1, X2, X3, Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3 );
+        }
+
+        AES_RROUND( Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3, X0, X1, X2, X3 );
+
+        X0 = *RK++ ^ \
+                ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( Y0       ) & 0xFF ]       ) ^
+                ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( Y3 >>  8 ) & 0xFF ] <<  8 ) ^
+                ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( Y2 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^
+                ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( Y1 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ] << 24 );
+
+        X1 = *RK++ ^ \
+                ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( Y1       ) & 0xFF ]       ) ^
+                ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( Y0 >>  8 ) & 0xFF ] <<  8 ) ^
+                ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( Y3 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^
+                ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( Y2 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ] << 24 );
+
+        X2 = *RK++ ^ \
+                ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( Y2       ) & 0xFF ]       ) ^
+                ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( Y1 >>  8 ) & 0xFF ] <<  8 ) ^
+                ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( Y0 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^
+                ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( Y3 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ] << 24 );
+
+        X3 = *RK++ ^ \
+                ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( Y3       ) & 0xFF ]       ) ^
+                ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( Y2 >>  8 ) & 0xFF ] <<  8 ) ^
+                ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( Y1 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^
+                ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( Y0 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ] << 24 );
+    }
+    else /* ENCRYPT */
+    {
+#endif /* AES_DECRYPTION */
+
+        for( i = (ctx->rounds >> 1) - 1; i > 0; i-- )
+        {
+            AES_FROUND( Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3, X0, X1, X2, X3 );
+            AES_FROUND( X0, X1, X2, X3, Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3 );
+        }
+
+        AES_FROUND( Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3, X0, X1, X2, X3 );
+
+        X0 = *RK++ ^ \
+                ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( Y0       ) & 0xFF ]       ) ^
+                ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( Y1 >>  8 ) & 0xFF ] <<  8 ) ^
+                ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( Y2 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^
+                ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( Y3 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ] << 24 );
+
+        X1 = *RK++ ^ \
+                ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( Y1       ) & 0xFF ]       ) ^
+                ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( Y2 >>  8 ) & 0xFF ] <<  8 ) ^
+                ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( Y3 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^
+                ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( Y0 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ] << 24 );
+
+        X2 = *RK++ ^ \
+                ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( Y2       ) & 0xFF ]       ) ^
+                ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( Y3 >>  8 ) & 0xFF ] <<  8 ) ^
+                ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( Y0 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^
+                ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( Y1 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ] << 24 );
+
+        X3 = *RK++ ^ \
+                ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( Y3       ) & 0xFF ]       ) ^
+                ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( Y0 >>  8 ) & 0xFF ] <<  8 ) ^
+                ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( Y1 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^
+                ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( Y2 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ] << 24 );
+
+#if AES_DECRYPTION  // whether AES decryption is supported
+    }
+#endif /* AES_DECRYPTION */
+
+    PUT_UINT32_LE( X0, output,  0 );
+    PUT_UINT32_LE( X1, output,  4 );
+    PUT_UINT32_LE( X2, output,  8 );
+    PUT_UINT32_LE( X3, output, 12 );
+
+    return( 0 );
+}
+/* end of aes.c */

+ 81 - 0
crypto/aes.h

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+/******************************************************************************
+*
+* THIS SOURCE CODE IS HEREBY PLACED INTO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN FOR THE GOOD OF ALL
+*
+* This is a simple and straightforward implementation of the AES Rijndael
+* 128-bit block cipher designed by Vincent Rijmen and Joan Daemen. The focus
+* of this work was correctness & accuracy.  It is written in 'C' without any
+* particular focus upon optimization or speed. It should be endian (memory
+* byte order) neutral since the few places that care are handled explicitly.
+*
+* This implementation of Rijndael was created by Steven M. Gibson of GRC.com.
+*
+* It is intended for general purpose use, but was written in support of GRC's
+* reference implementation of the SQRL (Secure Quick Reliable Login) client.
+*
+* See:    http://csrc.nist.gov/archive/aes/rijndael/wsdindex.html
+*
+* NO COPYRIGHT IS CLAIMED IN THIS WORK, HOWEVER, NEITHER IS ANY WARRANTY MADE
+* REGARDING ITS FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR PURPOSE. USE IT AT YOUR OWN RISK.
+*
+*******************************************************************************/
+
+#ifndef AES_HEADER
+#define AES_HEADER
+
+/******************************************************************************/
+#define AES_DECRYPTION  0       // whether AES decryption is supported
+/******************************************************************************/
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#define ENCRYPT         1       // specify whether we're encrypting
+#define DECRYPT         0       // or decrypting
+
+#if defined(_MSC_VER)
+    #include <basetsd.h>
+    typedef UINT32 uint32_t;
+#else
+    #include <inttypes.h>
+#endif
+
+typedef unsigned char uchar;    // add some convienent shorter types
+typedef unsigned int uint;
+
+
+/******************************************************************************
+ *  AES_INIT_KEYGEN_TABLES : MUST be called once before any AES use
+ ******************************************************************************/
+void aes_init_keygen_tables( void );
+
+
+/******************************************************************************
+ *  AES_CONTEXT : cipher context / holds inter-call data
+ ******************************************************************************/
+typedef struct {
+    int mode;           // 1 for Encryption, 0 for Decryption
+    int rounds;         // keysize-based rounds count
+    uint32_t *rk;       // pointer to current round key
+    uint32_t buf[68];   // key expansion buffer
+} aes_context;
+
+
+/******************************************************************************
+ *  AES_SETKEY : called to expand the key for encryption or decryption
+ ******************************************************************************/
+int aes_setkey( aes_context *ctx,       // pointer to context
+                int mode,               // 1 or 0 for Encrypt/Decrypt
+                const uchar *key,       // AES input key
+                uint keysize );         // size in bytes (must be 16, 24, 32 for
+		                        // 128, 192 or 256-bit keys respectively)
+                                        // returns 0 for success
+
+/******************************************************************************
+ *  AES_CIPHER : called to encrypt or decrypt ONE 128-bit block of data
+ ******************************************************************************/
+int aes_cipher( aes_context *ctx,       // pointer to context
+                const uchar input[16],  // 128-bit block to en/decipher
+                uchar output[16] );     // 128-bit output result block
+                                        // returns 0 for success
+
+#endif /* AES_HEADER */

+ 511 - 0
crypto/gcm.c

@@ -0,0 +1,511 @@
+/******************************************************************************
+*
+* THIS SOURCE CODE IS HEREBY PLACED INTO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN FOR THE GOOD OF ALL
+*
+* This is a simple and straightforward implementation of AES-GCM authenticated
+* encryption. The focus of this work was correctness & accuracy. It is written
+* in straight 'C' without any particular focus upon optimization or speed. It
+* should be endian (memory byte order) neutral since the few places that care
+* are handled explicitly.
+*
+* This implementation of AES-GCM was created by Steven M. Gibson of GRC.com.
+*
+* It is intended for general purpose use, but was written in support of GRC's
+* reference implementation of the SQRL (Secure Quick Reliable Login) client.
+*
+* See:    http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP-800-38D.pdf
+*         http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/documents/proposedmodes/
+*         gcm/gcm-revised-spec.pdf
+*
+* NO COPYRIGHT IS CLAIMED IN THIS WORK, HOWEVER, NEITHER IS ANY WARRANTY MADE
+* REGARDING ITS FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR PURPOSE. USE IT AT YOUR OWN RISK.
+*
+*******************************************************************************/
+
+#include "gcm.h"
+#include "aes.h"
+
+/******************************************************************************
+ *                      ==== IMPLEMENTATION WARNING ====
+ *
+ *  This code was developed for use within SQRL's fixed environmnent. Thus, it
+ *  is somewhat less "general purpose" than it would be if it were designed as
+ *  a general purpose AES-GCM library. Specifically, it bothers with almost NO
+ *  error checking on parameter limits, buffer bounds, etc. It assumes that it
+ *  is being invoked by its author or by someone who understands the values it
+ *  expects to receive. Its behavior will be undefined otherwise.
+ *
+ *  All functions that might fail are defined to return 'ints' to indicate a
+ *  problem. Most do not do so now. But this allows for error propagation out
+ *  of internal functions if robust error checking should ever be desired.
+ *
+ ******************************************************************************/
+
+/* Calculating the "GHASH"
+ *
+ * There are many ways of calculating the so-called GHASH in software, each with
+ * a traditional size vs performance tradeoff.  The GHASH (Galois field hash) is
+ * an intriguing construction which takes two 128-bit strings (also the cipher's
+ * block size and the fundamental operation size for the system) and hashes them
+ * into a third 128-bit result.
+ *
+ * Many implementation solutions have been worked out that use large precomputed
+ * table lookups in place of more time consuming bit fiddling, and this approach
+ * can be scaled easily upward or downward as needed to change the time/space
+ * tradeoff. It's been studied extensively and there's a solid body of theory and
+ * practice.  For example, without using any lookup tables an implementation
+ * might obtain 119 cycles per byte throughput, whereas using a simple, though
+ * large, key-specific 64 kbyte 8-bit lookup table the performance jumps to 13
+ * cycles per byte.
+ *
+ * And Intel's processors have, since 2010, included an instruction which does
+ * the entire 128x128->128 bit job in just several 64x64->128 bit pieces.
+ *
+ * Since SQRL is interactive, and only processing a few 128-bit blocks, I've
+ * settled upon a relatively slower but appealing small-table compromise which
+ * folds a bunch of not only time consuming but also bit twiddling into a simple
+ * 16-entry table which is attributed to Victor Shoup's 1996 work while at
+ * Bellcore: "On Fast and Provably Secure MessageAuthentication Based on
+ * Universal Hashing."  See: http://www.shoup.net/papers/macs.pdf
+ * See, also section 4.1 of the "gcm-revised-spec" cited above.
+ */
+
+/*
+ *  This 16-entry table of pre-computed constants is used by the
+ *  GHASH multiplier to improve over a strictly table-free but
+ *  significantly slower 128x128 bit multiple within GF(2^128).
+ */
+static const uint64_t last4[16] = {
+    0x0000, 0x1c20, 0x3840, 0x2460, 0x7080, 0x6ca0, 0x48c0, 0x54e0,
+    0xe100, 0xfd20, 0xd940, 0xc560, 0x9180, 0x8da0, 0xa9c0, 0xb5e0  };
+
+/*
+ * Platform Endianness Neutralizing Load and Store Macro definitions
+ * GCM wants platform-neutral Big Endian (BE) byte ordering
+ */
+#define GET_UINT32_BE(n,b,i) {                      \
+    (n) = ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i)    ] << 24 )         \
+        | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 1] << 16 )         \
+        | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 2] <<  8 )         \
+        | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 3]       ); }
+
+#define PUT_UINT32_BE(n,b,i) {                      \
+    (b)[(i)    ] = (uchar) ( (n) >> 24 );   \
+    (b)[(i) + 1] = (uchar) ( (n) >> 16 );   \
+    (b)[(i) + 2] = (uchar) ( (n) >>  8 );   \
+    (b)[(i) + 3] = (uchar) ( (n)       ); }
+
+
+/******************************************************************************
+ *
+ *  GCM_INITIALIZE
+ *
+ *  Must be called once to initialize the GCM library.
+ *
+ *  At present, this only calls the AES keygen table generator, which expands
+ *  the AES keying tables for use. This is NOT A THREAD-SAFE function, so it
+ *  MUST be called during system initialization before a multi-threading
+ *  environment is running.
+ *
+ ******************************************************************************/
+int gcm_initialize( void )
+{
+    aes_init_keygen_tables();
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
+
+/******************************************************************************
+ *
+ *  GCM_MULT
+ *
+ *  Performs a GHASH operation on the 128-bit input vector 'x', setting
+ *  the 128-bit output vector to 'x' times H using our precomputed tables.
+ *  'x' and 'output' are seen as elements of GCM's GF(2^128) Galois field.
+ *
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static void gcm_mult( gcm_context *ctx,     // pointer to established context
+                      const uchar x[16],    // pointer to 128-bit input vector
+                      uchar output[16] )    // pointer to 128-bit output vector
+{
+    int i;
+    uchar lo, hi, rem;
+    uint64_t zh, zl;
+
+    lo = (uchar)( x[15] & 0x0f );
+    hi = (uchar)( x[15] >> 4 );
+    zh = ctx->HH[lo];
+    zl = ctx->HL[lo];
+
+    for( i = 15; i >= 0; i-- ) {
+        lo = (uchar) ( x[i] & 0x0f );
+        hi = (uchar) ( x[i] >> 4 );
+
+        if( i != 15 ) {
+            rem = (uchar) ( zl & 0x0f );
+            zl = ( zh << 60 ) | ( zl >> 4 );
+            zh = ( zh >> 4 );
+            zh ^= (uint64_t) last4[rem] << 48;
+            zh ^= ctx->HH[lo];
+            zl ^= ctx->HL[lo];
+        }
+        rem = (uchar) ( zl & 0x0f );
+        zl = ( zh << 60 ) | ( zl >> 4 );
+        zh = ( zh >> 4 );
+        zh ^= (uint64_t) last4[rem] << 48;
+        zh ^= ctx->HH[hi];
+        zl ^= ctx->HL[hi];
+    }
+    PUT_UINT32_BE( zh >> 32, output, 0 );
+    PUT_UINT32_BE( zh, output, 4 );
+    PUT_UINT32_BE( zl >> 32, output, 8 );
+    PUT_UINT32_BE( zl, output, 12 );
+}
+
+
+/******************************************************************************
+ *
+ *  GCM_SETKEY
+ *
+ *  This is called to set the AES-GCM key. It initializes the AES key
+ *  and populates the gcm context's pre-calculated HTables.
+ *
+ ******************************************************************************/
+int gcm_setkey( gcm_context *ctx,   // pointer to caller-provided gcm context
+                const uchar *key,   // pointer to the AES encryption key
+                const uint keysize) // size in bytes (must be 16, 24, 32 for
+		                    // 128, 192 or 256-bit keys respectively)
+{
+    int ret, i, j;
+    uint64_t hi, lo;
+    uint64_t vl, vh;
+    unsigned char h[16];
+
+    memset( ctx, 0, sizeof(gcm_context) );  // zero caller-provided GCM context
+    memset( h, 0, 16 );                     // initialize the block to encrypt
+
+    // encrypt the null 128-bit block to generate a key-based value
+    // which is then used to initialize our GHASH lookup tables
+    if(( ret = aes_setkey( &ctx->aes_ctx, ENCRYPT, key, keysize )) != 0 )
+        return( ret );
+    if(( ret = aes_cipher( &ctx->aes_ctx, h, h )) != 0 )
+        return( ret );
+
+    GET_UINT32_BE( hi, h,  0  );    // pack h as two 64-bit ints, big-endian
+    GET_UINT32_BE( lo, h,  4  );
+    vh = (uint64_t) hi << 32 | lo;
+
+    GET_UINT32_BE( hi, h,  8  );
+    GET_UINT32_BE( lo, h,  12 );
+    vl = (uint64_t) hi << 32 | lo;
+
+    ctx->HL[8] = vl;                // 8 = 1000 corresponds to 1 in GF(2^128)
+    ctx->HH[8] = vh;
+    ctx->HH[0] = 0;                 // 0 corresponds to 0 in GF(2^128)
+    ctx->HL[0] = 0;
+
+    for( i = 4; i > 0; i >>= 1 ) {
+        uint32_t T = (uint32_t) ( vl & 1 ) * 0xe1000000U;
+        vl  = ( vh << 63 ) | ( vl >> 1 );
+        vh  = ( vh >> 1 ) ^ ( (uint64_t) T << 32);
+        ctx->HL[i] = vl;
+        ctx->HH[i] = vh;
+    }
+    for (i = 2; i < 16; i <<= 1 ) {
+        uint64_t *HiL = ctx->HL + i, *HiH = ctx->HH + i;
+        vh = *HiH;
+        vl = *HiL;
+        for( j = 1; j < i; j++ ) {
+            HiH[j] = vh ^ ctx->HH[j];
+            HiL[j] = vl ^ ctx->HL[j];
+        }
+    }
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
+
+/******************************************************************************
+ *
+ *    GCM processing occurs four phases: SETKEY, START, UPDATE and FINISH.
+ *
+ *  SETKEY: 
+ *  
+ *   START: Sets the Encryption/Decryption mode.
+ *          Accepts the initialization vector and additional data.
+ *
+ *  UPDATE: Encrypts or decrypts the plaintext or ciphertext.
+ *
+ *  FINISH: Performs a final GHASH to generate the authentication tag.
+ *
+ ******************************************************************************
+ *
+ *  GCM_START
+ *
+ *  Given a user-provided GCM context, this initializes it, sets the encryption
+ *  mode, and preprocesses the initialization vector and additional AEAD data.
+ *
+ ******************************************************************************/
+int gcm_start( gcm_context *ctx,    // pointer to user-provided GCM context
+               int mode,            // GCM_ENCRYPT or GCM_DECRYPT
+               const uchar *iv,     // pointer to initialization vector
+               size_t iv_len,       // IV length in bytes (should == 12)
+               const uchar *add,    // ptr to additional AEAD data (NULL if none)
+               size_t add_len )     // length of additional AEAD data (bytes)
+{
+    int ret;            // our error return if the AES encrypt fails
+    uchar work_buf[16]; // XOR source built from provided IV if len != 16
+    const uchar *p;     // general purpose array pointer
+    size_t use_len;     // byte count to process, up to 16 bytes
+    size_t i;           // local loop iterator
+
+    // since the context might be reused under the same key
+    // we zero the working buffers for this next new process
+    memset( ctx->y,   0x00, sizeof(ctx->y  ) );
+    memset( ctx->buf, 0x00, sizeof(ctx->buf) );
+    ctx->len = 0;
+    ctx->add_len = 0;
+
+    ctx->mode = mode;               // set the GCM encryption/decryption mode
+    ctx->aes_ctx.mode = ENCRYPT;    // GCM *always* runs AES in ENCRYPTION mode
+
+    if( iv_len == 12 ) {                // GCM natively uses a 12-byte, 96-bit IV
+        memcpy( ctx->y, iv, iv_len );   // copy the IV to the top of the 'y' buff
+        ctx->y[15] = 1;                 // start "counting" from 1 (not 0)
+    }
+    else    // if we don't have a 12-byte IV, we GHASH whatever we've been given
+    {   
+        memset( work_buf, 0x00, 16 );               // clear the working buffer
+        PUT_UINT32_BE( iv_len * 8, work_buf, 12 );  // place the IV into buffer
+
+        p = iv;
+        while( iv_len > 0 ) {
+            use_len = ( iv_len < 16 ) ? iv_len : 16;
+            for( i = 0; i < use_len; i++ ) ctx->y[i] ^= p[i];
+            gcm_mult( ctx, ctx->y, ctx->y );
+            iv_len -= use_len;
+            p += use_len;
+        }
+        for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) ctx->y[i] ^= work_buf[i];
+        gcm_mult( ctx, ctx->y, ctx->y );
+    }
+    if( ( ret = aes_cipher( &ctx->aes_ctx, ctx->y, ctx->base_ectr ) ) != 0 )
+        return( ret );
+
+    ctx->add_len = add_len;
+    p = add;
+    while( add_len > 0 ) {
+        use_len = ( add_len < 16 ) ? add_len : 16;
+        for( i = 0; i < use_len; i++ ) ctx->buf[i] ^= p[i];
+        gcm_mult( ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf );
+        add_len -= use_len;
+        p += use_len;
+    }
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
+/******************************************************************************
+ *
+ *  GCM_UPDATE
+ *
+ *  This is called once or more to process bulk plaintext or ciphertext data.
+ *  We give this some number of bytes of input and it returns the same number
+ *  of output bytes. If called multiple times (which is fine) all but the final
+ *  invocation MUST be called with length mod 16 == 0. (Only the final call can
+ *  have a partial block length of < 128 bits.)
+ *
+ ******************************************************************************/
+int gcm_update( gcm_context *ctx,       // pointer to user-provided GCM context
+                size_t length,          // length, in bytes, of data to process
+                const uchar *input,     // pointer to source data
+                uchar *output )         // pointer to destination data
+{
+    int ret;            // our error return if the AES encrypt fails
+    uchar ectr[16];     // counter-mode cipher output for XORing
+    size_t use_len;     // byte count to process, up to 16 bytes
+    size_t i;           // local loop iterator
+
+    ctx->len += length; // bump the GCM context's running length count
+
+    while( length > 0 ) {
+        // clamp the length to process at 16 bytes
+        use_len = ( length < 16 ) ? length : 16;
+
+        // increment the context's 128-bit IV||Counter 'y' vector
+        for( i = 16; i > 12; i-- ) if( ++ctx->y[i - 1] != 0 ) break;
+
+        // encrypt the context's 'y' vector under the established key
+        if( ( ret = aes_cipher( &ctx->aes_ctx, ctx->y, ectr ) ) != 0 )
+            return( ret );
+
+        // encrypt or decrypt the input to the output
+        if( ctx->mode == ENCRYPT )  
+        {
+             for( i = 0; i < use_len; i++ ) {
+                // XOR the cipher's ouptut vector (ectr) with our input
+                output[i] = (uchar) ( ectr[i] ^ input[i] );
+                // now we mix in our data into the authentication hash.
+                // if we're ENcrypting we XOR in the post-XOR (output) 
+                // results, but if we're DEcrypting we XOR in the input 
+                // data
+                ctx->buf[i] ^= output[i];
+            }
+        }
+            else                        
+        {
+            for( i = 0; i < use_len; i++ ) {
+                // but if we're DEcrypting we XOR in the input data first, 
+                // i.e. before saving to ouput data, otherwise if the input 
+                // and output buffer are the same (inplace decryption) we 
+                // would not get the correct auth tag
+
+       	        ctx->buf[i] ^= input[i];
+
+                // XOR the cipher's ouptut vector (ectr) with our input
+                output[i] = (uchar) ( ectr[i] ^ input[i] );
+             }
+        }
+        gcm_mult( ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf );    // perform a GHASH operation
+
+        length -= use_len;  // drop the remaining byte count to process
+        input  += use_len;  // bump our input pointer forward
+        output += use_len;  // bump our output pointer forward
+    }
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
+/******************************************************************************
+ *
+ *  GCM_FINISH
+ *
+ *  This is called once after all calls to GCM_UPDATE to finalize the GCM.
+ *  It performs the final GHASH to produce the resulting authentication TAG.
+ *
+ ******************************************************************************/
+int gcm_finish( gcm_context *ctx,   // pointer to user-provided GCM context
+                uchar *tag,         // pointer to buffer which receives the tag
+                size_t tag_len )    // length, in bytes, of the tag-receiving buf
+{
+    uchar work_buf[16];
+    uint64_t orig_len     = ctx->len * 8;
+    uint64_t orig_add_len = ctx->add_len * 8;
+    size_t i;
+
+    if( tag_len != 0 ) memcpy( tag, ctx->base_ectr, tag_len );
+
+    if( orig_len || orig_add_len ) {
+        memset( work_buf, 0x00, 16 );
+
+        PUT_UINT32_BE( ( orig_add_len >> 32 ), work_buf, 0  );
+        PUT_UINT32_BE( ( orig_add_len       ), work_buf, 4  );
+        PUT_UINT32_BE( ( orig_len     >> 32 ), work_buf, 8  );
+        PUT_UINT32_BE( ( orig_len           ), work_buf, 12 );
+
+        for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) ctx->buf[i] ^= work_buf[i];
+        gcm_mult( ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf );
+        for( i = 0; i < tag_len; i++ ) tag[i] ^= ctx->buf[i];
+    }
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
+
+/******************************************************************************
+ *
+ *  GCM_CRYPT_AND_TAG
+ *
+ *  This either encrypts or decrypts the user-provided data and, either
+ *  way, generates an authentication tag of the requested length. It must be
+ *  called with a GCM context whose key has already been set with GCM_SETKEY.
+ *
+ *  The user would typically call this explicitly to ENCRYPT a buffer of data
+ *  and optional associated data, and produce its an authentication tag.
+ *
+ *  To reverse the process the user would typically call the companion
+ *  GCM_AUTH_DECRYPT function to decrypt data and verify a user-provided
+ *  authentication tag.  The GCM_AUTH_DECRYPT function calls this function
+ *  to perform its decryption and tag generation, which it then compares.
+ *
+ ******************************************************************************/
+int gcm_crypt_and_tag(
+        gcm_context *ctx,       // gcm context with key already setup
+        int mode,               // cipher direction: GCM_ENCRYPT or GCM_DECRYPT
+        const uchar *iv,        // pointer to the 12-byte initialization vector
+        size_t iv_len,          // byte length if the IV. should always be 12
+        const uchar *add,       // pointer to the non-ciphered additional data
+        size_t add_len,         // byte length of the additional AEAD data
+        const uchar *input,     // pointer to the cipher data source
+        uchar *output,          // pointer to the cipher data destination
+        size_t length,          // byte length of the cipher data
+        uchar *tag,             // pointer to the tag to be generated
+        size_t tag_len )        // byte length of the tag to be generated
+{   /*
+       assuming that the caller has already invoked gcm_setkey to
+       prepare the gcm context with the keying material, we simply
+       invoke each of the three GCM sub-functions in turn...
+    */
+    gcm_start  ( ctx, mode, iv, iv_len, add, add_len );
+    gcm_update ( ctx, length, input, output );
+    gcm_finish ( ctx, tag, tag_len );
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
+
+/******************************************************************************
+ *
+ *  GCM_AUTH_DECRYPT
+ *
+ *  This DECRYPTS a user-provided data buffer with optional associated data.
+ *  It then verifies a user-supplied authentication tag against the tag just
+ *  re-created during decryption to verify that the data has not been altered.
+ *
+ *  This function calls GCM_CRYPT_AND_TAG (above) to perform the decryption
+ *  and authentication tag generation.
+ *
+ ******************************************************************************/
+int gcm_auth_decrypt(
+        gcm_context *ctx,       // gcm context with key already setup
+        const uchar *iv,        // pointer to the 12-byte initialization vector
+        size_t iv_len,          // byte length if the IV. should always be 12
+        const uchar *add,       // pointer to the non-ciphered additional data
+        size_t add_len,         // byte length of the additional AEAD data
+        const uchar *input,     // pointer to the cipher data source
+        uchar *output,          // pointer to the cipher data destination
+        size_t length,          // byte length of the cipher data
+        const uchar *tag,       // pointer to the tag to be authenticated
+        size_t tag_len )        // byte length of the tag <= 16
+{
+    uchar check_tag[16];        // the tag generated and returned by decryption
+    int diff;                   // an ORed flag to detect authentication errors
+    size_t i;                   // our local iterator
+    /*
+       we use GCM_DECRYPT_AND_TAG (above) to perform our decryption
+       (which is an identical XORing to reverse the previous one)
+       and also to re-generate the matching authentication tag
+    */
+    gcm_crypt_and_tag(  ctx, DECRYPT, iv, iv_len, add, add_len,
+                        input, output, length, check_tag, tag_len );
+
+    // now we verify the authentication tag in 'constant time'
+    for( diff = 0, i = 0; i < tag_len; i++ )
+        diff |= tag[i] ^ check_tag[i];
+
+    if( diff != 0 ) {                   // see whether any bits differed?
+        memset( output, 0, length );    // if so... wipe the output data
+        return( GCM_AUTH_FAILURE );     // return GCM_AUTH_FAILURE
+    }
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
+/******************************************************************************
+ *
+ *  GCM_ZERO_CTX
+ *
+ *  The GCM context contains both the GCM context and the AES context.
+ *  This includes keying and key-related material which is security-
+ *  sensitive, so it MUST be zeroed after use. This function does that.
+ *
+ ******************************************************************************/
+void gcm_zero_ctx( gcm_context *ctx )
+{
+    // zero the context originally provided to us
+    memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( gcm_context ) );
+}

+ 187 - 0
crypto/gcm.h

@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+/******************************************************************************
+*
+* THIS SOURCE CODE IS HEREBY PLACED INTO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN FOR THE GOOD OF ALL
+*
+* This is a simple and straightforward implementation of AES-GCM authenticated
+* encryption. The focus of this work was correctness & accuracy. It is written
+* in straight 'C' without any particular focus upon optimization or speed. It
+* should be endian (memory byte order) neutral since the few places that care
+* are handled explicitly.
+*
+* This implementation of AES-GCM was created by Steven M. Gibson of GRC.com.
+*
+* It is intended for general purpose use, but was written in support of GRC's
+* reference implementation of the SQRL (Secure Quick Reliable Login) client.
+*
+* See:    http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP-800-38D.pdf
+*         http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/documents/proposedmodes/ \
+*         gcm/gcm-revised-spec.pdf
+*
+* NO COPYRIGHT IS CLAIMED IN THIS WORK, HOWEVER, NEITHER IS ANY WARRANTY MADE
+* REGARDING ITS FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR PURPOSE. USE IT AT YOUR OWN RISK.
+*
+*******************************************************************************/
+#ifndef GCM_HEADER
+#define GCM_HEADER
+
+#define GCM_AUTH_FAILURE    0x55555555  // authentication failure
+
+#include "aes.h"                        // gcm_context includes aes_context
+
+#if defined(_MSC_VER)
+    #include <basetsd.h>
+    typedef unsigned int size_t;// use the right type for length declarations
+    typedef UINT32 uint32_t;
+    typedef UINT64 uint64_t;
+#else
+    #include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+
+
+/******************************************************************************
+ *  GCM_CONTEXT : GCM context / holds keytables, instance data, and AES ctx
+ ******************************************************************************/
+typedef struct {
+    int mode;               // cipher direction: encrypt/decrypt
+    uint64_t len;           // cipher data length processed so far
+    uint64_t add_len;       // total add data length
+    uint64_t HL[16];        // precalculated lo-half HTable
+    uint64_t HH[16];        // precalculated hi-half HTable
+    uchar base_ectr[16];    // first counter-mode cipher output for tag
+    uchar y[16];            // the current cipher-input IV|Counter value
+    uchar buf[16];          // buf working value
+    aes_context aes_ctx;    // cipher context used
+} gcm_context;
+
+
+/******************************************************************************
+ *  GCM_CONTEXT : MUST be called once before ANY use of this library
+ ******************************************************************************/
+int gcm_initialize( void );
+
+
+/******************************************************************************
+ *  GCM_SETKEY : sets the GCM (and AES) keying material for use
+ ******************************************************************************/
+int gcm_setkey( gcm_context *ctx,   // caller-provided context ptr
+                const uchar *key,   // pointer to cipher key
+                const uint keysize  // size in bytes (must be 16, 24, 32 for
+		                    // 128, 192 or 256-bit keys respectively)
+); // returns 0 for success
+
+
+/******************************************************************************
+ *
+ *  GCM_CRYPT_AND_TAG
+ *
+ *  This either encrypts or decrypts the user-provided data and, either
+ *  way, generates an authentication tag of the requested length. It must be
+ *  called with a GCM context whose key has already been set with GCM_SETKEY.
+ *
+ *  The user would typically call this explicitly to ENCRYPT a buffer of data
+ *  and optional associated data, and produce its an authentication tag.
+ *
+ *  To reverse the process the user would typically call the companion
+ *  GCM_AUTH_DECRYPT function to decrypt data and verify a user-provided
+ *  authentication tag.  The GCM_AUTH_DECRYPT function calls this function
+ *  to perform its decryption and tag generation, which it then compares.
+ *
+ ******************************************************************************/
+int gcm_crypt_and_tag(
+        gcm_context *ctx,       // gcm context with key already setup
+        int mode,               // cipher direction: ENCRYPT (1) or DECRYPT (0)
+        const uchar *iv,        // pointer to the 12-byte initialization vector
+        size_t iv_len,          // byte length if the IV. should always be 12
+        const uchar *add,       // pointer to the non-ciphered additional data
+        size_t add_len,         // byte length of the additional AEAD data
+        const uchar *input,     // pointer to the cipher data source
+        uchar *output,          // pointer to the cipher data destination
+        size_t length,          // byte length of the cipher data
+        uchar *tag,             // pointer to the tag to be generated
+        size_t tag_len );       // byte length of the tag to be generated
+
+
+/******************************************************************************
+ *
+ *  GCM_AUTH_DECRYPT
+ *
+ *  This DECRYPTS a user-provided data buffer with optional associated data.
+ *  It then verifies a user-supplied authentication tag against the tag just
+ *  re-created during decryption to verify that the data has not been altered.
+ *
+ *  This function calls GCM_CRYPT_AND_TAG (above) to perform the decryption
+ *  and authentication tag generation.
+ *
+ ******************************************************************************/
+int gcm_auth_decrypt(
+        gcm_context *ctx,       // gcm context with key already setup
+        const uchar *iv,        // pointer to the 12-byte initialization vector
+        size_t iv_len,          // byte length if the IV. should always be 12
+        const uchar *add,       // pointer to the non-ciphered additional data
+        size_t add_len,         // byte length of the additional AEAD data
+        const uchar *input,     // pointer to the cipher data source
+        uchar *output,          // pointer to the cipher data destination
+        size_t length,          // byte length of the cipher data
+        const uchar *tag,       // pointer to the tag to be authenticated
+        size_t tag_len );       // byte length of the tag <= 16
+
+
+/******************************************************************************
+ *
+ *  GCM_START
+ *
+ *  Given a user-provided GCM context, this initializes it, sets the encryption
+ *  mode, and preprocesses the initialization vector and additional AEAD data.
+ *
+ ******************************************************************************/
+int gcm_start( gcm_context *ctx,    // pointer to user-provided GCM context
+               int mode,            // ENCRYPT (1) or DECRYPT (0)
+               const uchar *iv,     // pointer to initialization vector
+               size_t iv_len,       // IV length in bytes (should == 12)
+               const uchar *add,    // pointer to additional AEAD data (NULL if none)
+               size_t add_len );    // length of additional AEAD data (bytes)
+
+
+/******************************************************************************
+ *
+ *  GCM_UPDATE
+ *
+ *  This is called once or more to process bulk plaintext or ciphertext data.
+ *  We give this some number of bytes of input and it returns the same number
+ *  of output bytes. If called multiple times (which is fine) all but the final
+ *  invocation MUST be called with length mod 16 == 0. (Only the final call can
+ *  have a partial block length of < 128 bits.)
+ *
+ ******************************************************************************/
+int gcm_update( gcm_context *ctx,       // pointer to user-provided GCM context
+                size_t length,          // length, in bytes, of data to process
+                const uchar *input,     // pointer to source data
+                uchar *output );        // pointer to destination data
+
+
+/******************************************************************************
+ *
+ *  GCM_FINISH
+ *
+ *  This is called once after all calls to GCM_UPDATE to finalize the GCM.
+ *  It performs the final GHASH to produce the resulting authentication TAG.
+ *
+ ******************************************************************************/
+int gcm_finish( gcm_context *ctx,   // pointer to user-provided GCM context
+                uchar *tag,         // ptr to tag buffer - NULL if tag_len = 0
+                size_t tag_len );   // length, in bytes, of the tag-receiving buf
+
+
+/******************************************************************************
+ *
+ *  GCM_ZERO_CTX
+ *
+ *  The GCM context contains both the GCM context and the AES context.
+ *  This includes keying and key-related material which is security-
+ *  sensitive, so it MUST be zeroed after use. This function does that.
+ *
+ ******************************************************************************/
+void gcm_zero_ctx( gcm_context *ctx );
+
+
+#endif /* GCM_HEADER */